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Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society

Sel f, O the r ne ss, T he olo gy, a n d
O n tol o gy: A Cri ti c al
E ng a gem e nt be tw ee n Tilli c h a n d
Kri ste va, Le vi na s, a n d B a tail le
Jo nat ha n Rot hchi ld
Paul Tillich would no doubt be fascinated with
postmodern thinkers, whom—to a considerable extent—he had anticipated in his critical appreciation
of Nietzsche, Expressionism, depth psychology, and
the “death of God” theologians. My purpose here is
to analyze Tillich’s conceptions of self with respect
to postmodern thinkers who characterize the self as
the displaced self, anti-cogito, or the self as constituted by otherness. Postmodern thinkers summarily
assert that the self is to be conceptualized in relational terms vis-à-vis the alterity of the other, who is
trace, infinity, or lordship (Emmanuel Levinas), abject (Julia Kristeva), or ecstatic rupture (Georges
Bataille). These perspectives interrogate Tillich’s
theology as to its capacity to accommodate notions
of otherness. They deconstruct concepts and images
that totalize (e.g., being), privilege the unity of the
self, or reduce otherness to sameness. They therefore
present a formidable challenge to Tillich’s system,
including, for example, his notions of selfcenteredness, self-transcendence, and the basic ontological structure of self and world. My essay, however, attempts to render this tension productive by
highlighting the fruits for both interlocutors.
My thesis is three-fold. First, I affirm sustainability of Tillich’s project by probing the relationship between self, other, ontology, and theology
through the mediation of Oliver Davies’s recent
work. Second, I argue that critical engagement between Tillich and Kristeva, Levinas, and Bataille
exposes the limits of Tillich’s notions of otherness,
particularly with respect to alterity, transcendence,
and embodiment. Third, I contend that Tillich’s concepts of symbol and love as reunion preserve participation and selfhood and problematize notions of
meaninglessness and subjugation of self to other in
Kristeva, Levinas, and Bataille.
The Sustainability of Tillich’s Ontology in the
Contemporary Contexts
Is Tillich’s ontology still tenable within the antimetaphysical milieu of postmodernity? To ascertain
the answer we will consider the recent work of
Oliver Davies. In A Theology of Compassion: Meta-
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physics of Difference and the Renewal of Tradition,
Davies reconceptualizes the language of being to
construct a kenotic Christian ontology of difference.
Appealing to Levinas and Ricoeur to address relationality in the post-Holocaust context of annihilation, Davies reinterprets being as “the medium of
relation between self and other”1 and ontology as a
narrativity of being disclosed through languagebased exchanges.2 Davies problematizes conceptions
within traditional metaphysics that emphasize being
as a unity3 because they perpetuate essentialism and
exclude and vitiate the concrete other. Yet, given the
postmodern emphasis on fragmentation and attenuation of the self, Davies affirms the necessity of retrieving the language of being: “[T]he language of
being offers an important resource for articulating
and drawing forth the intrinsic unity of the self
which, albeit deferred, is the ground for the knowledge of the world as such.”4 He therefore develops a
theology of compassion that construes ontology as
relationality committed to “the absolute primacy of
the ethical relation with respect to the concrete
other.”5
Davies posits that the self’s affirmation of otherness concomitantly enriches or deepens the self’s
existence, that is, the self’s being. Compassion compels kenosis, “a riskful giving and an opening of the
self before existence,”6 that interconnects existence
and ontology because “heightened existence represents a higher degree of ontological density.”7
Moreover, Davies envisages that self-displacement
of compassion “sets up a flow of enriched existence
which draws others towards those who in this way,
as if by the attraction of being itself”8 and reinscribes
self and other in terms of being and existence.
Davies, however, notes that the ontologies of
Tillich, Bultmann, and Rahner “seem out of place in
the vigorously language-centred and deconstructive
landscapes of the present day.”9 There are no additional references to Tillich’s ontology, but evaluation of the criticisms with respect to Rahner can be
illuminating for study of Tillich. Davies writes: “We
differ from Rahner then to the extent that knowledge
of the other is determined by…the ethical particularity of the relation of the self to the other, and that
transcendence is a possibility which awakens from
within that relation and not from an a priori ground
of all knowing which encompasses it.”10 I contend
that this worry about an a priori ground negating
relationality and difference appears misplaced.
Among possible Tillichian rejoinders,11 Tillich’s in-
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heritance of various aspects of Schelling’s philosophy disavows essentialism and accounts for otherness. Tillich affirms the interconnections between
essence and existence: “[Schelling] did not, however, abolish what Hegel and he had done before. He
preserved a philosophy of essence. Against this he
put the philosophy of existence. Existentialism is not
a philosophy which can stand on its own legs. Actually it has no legs. It is always based on a vision of
the essential structure of reality.”12 This attempted
fusion of existence and the essential structure of reality frames Tillich’s correlative method and his
conceptions of self and reality (e.g., the tension between life and system and being and non-being).
Schelling attempts to reintegrate essence and existence because he integrates the “negative philosophy” of the a priori system of absolute Essence and
the “positive philosophy” of absolute Existent.
Schelling’s thought bears the influence of Jacob
Boehme, whom Schelling first encountered in the
work of Franz von Baader. This influence compels
Schelling to posit that God assumes Being through a
dialectic of Yes and No; in similar manner, humans
experience freedom as spirit, but through contradiction.13 Drawing upon Boehme’s notion of abyss in
God, Schelling in Ages of the World states: “Because
the Godhead, in itself neither having being nor not
having being, is, with respect to external Being, necessarily a consuming No, it must therefore
also…necessarily be an eternal Yes, reinforcing
Love, the essence of all essences.”14
Tillich traces shifts within Schelling’s corpus,
notably Schelling’s transformation from his early
philosophy of identity between nature and spirit (articulated as a philosophy of nature in his 1800 The
System of Transcendental Idealism) to his examination of the self-contradiction of the will and the
problem of evil (expressed in his 1809 On the Nature of Human) to his later exploration of the dynamic of the finite and the infinite and the affirmation of existence in positive philosophy (discussed in
his 1811-1815 The Ages of the World and the most
influential on Tillich). The later Schelling’s concept
of potency of being is particularly fecund for Tillich’s understanding of ontology, self, and otherness.15 From his reading of Schelling, Tillich places
emphasis on the divine process of dialectical Yes
and No that undergirds God’s existence as a personal
being: “Now, however, Schelling asserted: God exists. He has separated himself from his ground and
has won existence [for himself] as living personality,
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by letting his ground hold sway over itself and by
struggling against it.”16 Tillich asserts that without
the otherness within God, there would no being, no
life, and no personal God.17 To be sure, there are differences between Tillich and Schelling,18 but it is
apparent that Schelling significantly informs Tillich’s understanding of the relationship between self,
otherness, and reality. Tillich’s nuanced understanding, in my judgment, gainsays Davies’s criticisms
and attests to the viability of Tillich’s writings in a
postmodern context.
Postmodernity, Otherness, and Ontology:
Bataille on Ecstasy and Nonknowledge
Bataille, Kristeva, and Levinas in disparate ways
address suffering, exploitation, and annihilation in
the world;19 each is concerned with the relationship
between self and other in terms of communication—
but not communication couched in terms of rational
discourse or systematic project. Bataille asks: How
can one communicate to the other the excess of desire and experience without explaining away the profundity of this experience or this other? Through
Nietzschean inspired fragments, Bataille insists that
one must disentangle knowledge, communication,
and self: “If we didn’t know how to dramatize, we
wouldn’t be able to leave ourselves...But a sort of
rupture—in anguish—leaves us at the limit of tears:
in such a case we lose ourselves, we forget ourselves
and communicate with an elusive beyond.”20 This
anguished rupture functions to undercut the totality
of knowledge or the “satisfaction”21 of the “prison”22
of the Hegelian project, Bataille’s primary target.23
Rupture unfolds ecstasy, which Bataille understands
to be a “contestation of knowledge”24 or “the defeat
of thought”25 that discloses excess without annihilating otherness and demands supplication of the self in
the “horror of surrender.”26 This horror of surrender
entails anguish and despair, yet it is manifested as
rapture and joy. Shorn of the limits of discursive
experience that enclose the self and sublimate otherness, ecstasy engenders an “inner presence which we
cannot apprehend without a startled jump of our entire being, detesting the servility of discourse.”27 In
the realm of inner presence, ecstasy, sacrifice, eroticism, laughter, and the sacred converge in a transcendence that eviscerates project and creates a
situation “whereby life situates itself in proportion to
the impossible.”28
A conspicuous example of ecstatic attempts to
surmount the “servility of discourse” occurs in
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Bataille’s contemplating the image of a decapitated
Chinese man. Subjected to gruesome torture or, as
Bataille puts it, laceration, the afflicted man paradoxically appears to Bataille to be in a sublime state
of joy. Despite ethical questions regarding instrumentality raised by interpreters such as Amy Hollywood,29 contemplating the victim induces rupture in
Bataille: “I loved him with a love in which the sadistic instinct played no part: he communicated his pain
to me or perhaps the excessive nature of his pain,
and it was precisely that which I was seeking, not so
as to take pleasure in it, but in order to ruin in me
that which is opposed to ruin.”30 No narrative can
explain this relationality, for that would be tantamount to Hegelian satisfaction, not transcendent ecstasy. This ecstatic experience constitutes a sacrifice
that is effusive in that “it destroys the depths of the
heart, the depths of being, by unveiling them.”31
Though Bataille abrogates the soteriological32 underpinnings of the Passion, the cross communicates
intense pain that disabuses self-interested project.
Tillich’s Response to Bataille: Ecstasy and Rational Structure
Is Tillich’s work tantamount to “project”? To
address Bataille’s criticisms, let us consider Tillich’s
employment of the term ecstasy. Tillich conceives of
ecstasy in terms of a self-transcendence experienced
in and through rational knowledge; unlike Bataille,
Tillich does not perceive an incompatibility between
ecstasy, knowledge (reason), self, and other. Tillich’s basic ontological structure of self and world
does not preclude notions of otherness or ecstasy; a
fortiori, ecstasy is necessitated by the otherness of
non-being that threatens self and world. Tillich describes the tumultuous, but intimate relationship between reason, ecstasy, and the encounter with nonbeing:
The threat of nonbeing, grasping the mind, produces the ‘ontological shock’ in which the negative side of the mystery of being—its abysmal
element is experienced. ‘Shock’ points to a state
of mind in which the mind is thrown out of its
normal balance, shaken in its structure. Reason
reaches it boundary line, is thrown back upon itself, and then is driven again to its extreme
situation.33
Tillich, therefore, concurs with Bataille’s vision
of the traumatic effects of ecstasy, but he does not
equate this disorientation with Bataille’s nonknowledge. Appropriated from Scriptural and Neo-
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platonic, sources,34 ecstasy according to Tillich “is
the classical term for this state of being grasped by
the Spiritual Presence” that “drives the spirit of man
beyond itself without destroying its essential, i.e.,
rational, structure.”35 In contrast to the destruction of
the demonic, ecstatic reconfiguration is creative because it promotes self-transcendence, yet it preserves
participation within the ground of being. This transcendence/ participation dialectic occurs in and
through the theonomous interpenetration of reason,
ecstasy, and revelation, for “[e]cstasy occurs only if
the mind is grasped by the mystery, namely, by the
ground of being and meaning. And, conversely,
there is no revelation without ecstasy.”36 Ecstasy,
reason, and revelation converge in ultimate concern,
where ecstasy is not reduced to project but is selftranscending reason that assumes disparate forms,
including prophetic witness, agapic love, and
prayer..37
Julia Kristeva on Alterity and Embodiment
Influenced by Freud and Lacan, Julia Kristeva’s
work intersects semiotics, psychoanalysis, and feminism. She shares Bataille’s disquiet towards the hegemony of the Hegelian project in the Western
mindset. Kristeva characterizes otherness as the abject or the discarded that destabilizes self and society. In Powers of Horror, Kristeva construes abject
as “the jettisoned object [that] is radically excluded
and draws me toward the place where meaning collapses.”38 Similar to Bataille’s notion of ecstasy as
communicating non-knowledge and, as we will see
below, Levinas’s repudiation of totality, Kristeva’s
abject resists reduction to preconceived meanings.
Abject precludes simple elision between self and
other, “[f]or the space that engrosses the deject, the
excluded is never one, nor homogeneous, nor totalizable, but essentially divisible, foldable, and
catastrophic.”39 Moreover, just as Bataille interweaves anguish and rapture, Kristeva associates annihilation of the self and jouissance or radical joy.
Kristeva extends her analysis further by juxtaposing the abject and the maternal body. The maternal body, particularly with its the liminal boundaries
constituted by the fusion of fluids, dependencies,
and identities, has been muted in Western thought
such that a woman “will not be able to accede to the
complexity of being divided, of heterogeneity, of the
catastrophic-fold-of-‘being.’”40 Additionally noted
by Levinas,41 the maternal body’s unrepresentable
abject stands in opposition to the complicity of the
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linguistically and socially constructed narcissism. In
Tales of Love, Kristeva contends that the image of
the Virgin cannot express the otherness of motherhood because it signifies “the woman whose entire
body is an emptiness through which the paternal
word is conveyed…[and thereby] had remarkably
subsumed the maternal ‘abject.’”42
Tillich’s Response to Kristeva: Body as a Dimension of the Person
Tillich’s treatment of the body is admittedly limited, though his attention to the ontological structure
of self and world does not obviate considerations of
the body. In Dynamics of Faith, Tillich develops his
concept of self-centeredness, where “body, soul, and
spirit are not three parts of man. They are dimensions of man’s being, always within each other.”43
Centeredness of the self enables Tillich to account
for these distinct, but interrelated spheres of human
existence. Perhaps Tillich’s most sensitive treatment
of embodiment, assessed by interpreters such as
Mary Ann Stenger,44 is illustrated in his critique of
the father-image of God within Protestant theology.
Tillich suggests that “[t]he attempt to show that
nothing can be said about God theologically before
the statement is made that he is the power of being
in all being is, at the same time, a way of reducing
the predominance of the male element in the symbolization of the divine.”45 Kristeva concurs with
Tillich’s hermeneutics of suspicion vis-à-vis gendered theological construction, but she would problematize Tillich’s perduring image of selfintegration. According to Tillich, self-integration
coalesces body and mind, “for only then is mutual
strangeness and interference excluded.”46 Kristeva’s
concern for the ineluctable “heterogeneity” of the
body therefore appears underappreciated by Tillich
even if he is acutely aware of estrangement.47
Levinas: Totality, Communication, and
Otherness
Writing in a post-Holocaust context, Emmanuel
Levinas censures the totalizing tendencies of Western thought from Parmenides to Hegel to Husserl to
Heidegger. These various models cannot appreciate
otherness: “Western philosophy has most often been
an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same by
interposition of a middle term that ensures the comprehension of being.”48 Levinas argues that his philosophical mentors subsume otherness into rubrics
of intelligibility (Husserl’s transcendent reductions
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and the search for absolute foundations) and homogeneity (Heidegger’s preoccupation with Dasein 49).
Levinas intends to debunk the Western project of
ontology and its proclivity toward totality. Consequently, he embraces the hyperbolic, the superlative,
the exteriority, and that “which is not a mode of being showing itself in a theme.”50
Ontology reflects the domestication and reduction of otherness; it is encapsulated in what Levinas
denominates as the said, “the birthplace of ontology.”51 Levinas affirms communication between self
and other, but communication as the saying whose
“articulation and signifyingness [are] antecedent to
ontology.”52 Levinas upholds saying because it does
not efface the other, it does not imprison the infinity
and trace of the other, and it functions as “exposure”53 and not (Hegelian) “recognition”54 in that it
induces the self to denude, strip itself, and submit to
otherness. Levinas insists that to be truly for-theother one must experience an intersubjective encounter with otherness that puts one’s entire being
into question. Levinas holds that ethics is metaphysics, not ontology, because metaphysics invites desire, infinity (e.g., the Good beyond Being in Plato
and Plotinus because “[t]he Good is before being”55),
fracture (because “the breakup of essence is ethics”56
manifested in the “[r]upture of being qua being”57),
and otherness that precede the thematizing and totalizing character of ontology. This otherness imposes
“unlimited responsibility”58 that denies individual
freedom: “It is because there is a vigilance before
the awakening that the cogito is possible, so that ethics is before ontology. Behind the arrival of the human there is already the vigilance for the other. The
transcendental I in its nakedness comes from the
awakening by and for the other.”59
This primordial “awakening” challenges Tillich’s ontological structure of self and world. Levinas contends that otherness annuls this structure:
To transcend oneself, to leave one’s home to the
point of leaving oneself, is to substitute oneself
for another. It is, in my bearing of myself, not to
conduct myself well, but by my unicity as a
unique being to expiate for the other. The openness of space as an openness of self without a
world, without a place, utopia, the not being
walled in, inspiration to the end, even to expiration, is proximity of the other which is possible
only as responsibility for the other, as substitution for him…[I]t is because newness comes
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from the other that there is in newness transcendence and signification.60
Responsibility for the other, not the essential
character of the self, radically shapes the formation
of the self’s conscience. Levinas asks: “Is not the
face of one’s fellow man the original locus in which
transcendence calls an authority with a silent voice
in which God comes to mind? Original locus of the
Infinite?”61
Tillich’s Response to Levinas
In contrast to Levinas’s notion of the silent voice
induced by the face of the other, Tillich contends
that the silent voice of the moral imperative, the confrontation with one’s essential being, becomes actualized in and through one’s own conscience. Tillich
conceives of conscience as a fundamental mechanism for overcoming the problem of the dividedness
of the self. Though Luther’s view of conscience as
an inner voice informs Tillich’s understanding of
conscience, Heidegger’s appeal to silence also has
significant import for Tillich’s view. Heidegger describes the call of conscience as declaring a silent
nothing: “In the appeal Dasein gives itself to understand its own potentiality-for-being. This calling is
therefore a keeping-silent…Only in keeping silent
does the conscience call.”62 Though Tillich appropriates Heidegger’s image of conscience as the silent
voice,63 he does amend Heidegger’s conception. Tillich submits that “the self to which the conscience
calls is the essential, not as Heidegger believes, the
existential self. It calls us to what we essentially are,
but it does not tell with certainty what that is.”64
It is critical, however, to note that Tillich does
not disengage this silent call of the essential from
relationality. For example, in a 1943 radio address,
Tillich impels his German listeners not merely to
confront an abstract evil but also to undertake practical measures in response to the suffering of others:
“So speak the voices from the land of the dead to
you, the voices of the Jewish children and women
and old people murdered by the Nazis under your
noses. And when you ask where this voice of the
dead is speaking to you, you yourselves know the
answer: it is the voice of your own conscience…You
can no longer silence this voice within yourselves.”65
This convergence of essence (the inner voice) and
existence (the voices of the suffering) underlies the
reasons why conscience is both “the most subjective
self-interpretation of personal life”66 and a transmoral judgment “according to the participation in a
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reality which transcends the sphere of moral commands.”67 Levinas worries about “our indifference of
‘good conscience’ for what is far and what is near;”68
Tillich similarly disabuses this indifference with respect to the demands of essence (an absolute imperative) and existence (the particular circumstances of
the situation).
Does this analysis of conscience mitigate the
claims that Tillich’s ethics constitutes an overly individualistic ethic (and thus reinforces Levinas’s
critiques of totality)? Eberhard Amelung points to
individualistic tendencies in Tillich’s thought: “Tillich has done more than most German philosophers
and theologians in order to overcome the individualistic approach of German idealism. And yet, perhaps
due to the influence of C.G. Jung and psychotherapy, the self remains the center of the system. As
Tillich grew older this tendency became stronger. In
the course of this development his ethic also remained strongly individualistic.”69 Thomas Ogletree,
in Hospitality to the Stranger that engages Levinas
and Ricoeur out of a framework of Christian ethics,
deems compelling Tillich’s appeal to a selftranscending moral imperative, but Ogletree too discovers shortcomings in Tillich’s system with respect
to encounters between others: “Consequently, we
still do not find in Tillich’s work an account of the
actual manifestation of the material meaning of the
moral imperative in the concrete encounter between
persons. What is even more disappointing is that
Tillich, while seeming to give central place to the Ithou encounter in the constitution of moral experience, continually subordinates that encounter to the
dynamics of self-integration.”70 Ogletree concludes
that a solution lies somewhere between a Tillichian
self-integration and a Levinasian call of the other.
Though Amelung and Ogletree are correct in pressing Tillich on this crucial issue of self and other, I
argue that both thinkers do not fully appreciate the
aspects of relationality and community (undertaken
comprehensively in the third volume of the Systematic Theology) that underlie and sustain questions of
self, otherness, love, and justice and to which we
now turn to as a conclusion.
Tillich’s Insights: Symbols and Love as Reunion
The dialogue between Tillich and the postmodern thinkers has revealed both the limits and insights
of Tillich’s ontology. One insight that has been discussed pertains to the dynamic between transcendence and participation, where the self is tran-
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scended in its encounter with disparate forms of otherness, yet the self is irreducibly preserved in that it
remains embedded in the essential structures of reality. Symbols constitute one dimension where transcendence and participation co-exist in a fruitful tension; symbols open the self to new levels of transcendence, but they affirm the presence of meaning
even as they nullify and disintegrate this meaning.71
Love as the reunion of the separated functions
similarly along the transcendence/ participation dialectic. As Tillich writes: “Love is the drive toward
the reunion of the separated; this is ontologically and
therefore universally true.”72 This drive toward reunion, exemplified in agape but funded by the desire
of eros, entails “participation in the other one
through participation in the transcendent unity of
unambiguous life,”73 and it is manifested as “participating knowledge which changes both the knower
and the known in the very act of loving knowledge.”74 This “loving knowledge,” even if fragmentary within the Spiritual Presence, mediates between
absolutism and relativism and enables Tillich to respond to postmodern critics of ontology. Love as
reunion affirms, yet transforms self and other, intersubjectivity, and justice, in ways that Bataille,
Kristeva, and Levinas75 appear to abdicate in their
attention to otherness. As recent works in Tillichian
scholarship76 demonstrate, engagement between Tillich and postmodernity should continue to yield constructive conversations.
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1963.
____________. Theology of Culture. Edited by
Robert Kimball. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1959.
____________. What is Religion? Edited with an
Introduction by James Luther Adams. New
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969.
Wyschogrod, Edith. “God and ‘Being’s Move’ in the
Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.” The Journal
of Religion 62 (1982): 145-155.

1

A Theology of Compassion, XVII.
Davies explains the ways Bakhtinian dialogism and
pragmatics pertain to an enhanced being: “Within such a
dialogical view of the self, the encounter with the other as
interlocutor becomes central to our own self-possession as
speaking and reflexive creatures, and becomes, as we
have argued, the epiphany of being, as the existential realization of our own dialectical self-transcendence” (Ibid.,
159). To reify such connections between narrativity and
being, Davies appeal to the stories of Holocaust victims
Etty Hillesum and Edith Stein and an unnamed victim of
ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.
3
Davies implicates modern figures in his indictment
of ontology: “We need not progress along the Leibnizean
and Heideggerian path of asking what is the meaning of
being as such, which would inevitably be to replace our
preferred paradigm, which is concerned specifically with
the self in relation to the other, with the model we have
called ‘Being and Oneness,’ which focuses upon the medium of being itself, to the relative exclusion of the concrete being” (Ibid., 52).
4
Ibid., 53.
5
Ibid., 73. Davies explains: “Compassion is the recognition of the otherness of the other, as an otherness
which stands beyond our own world, beyond our own
2
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constructions of otherness even. But it is also the discovery of our own nature, as a horizon of subjectivity that is
foundationally ordered to the world of another experience,
in what Paul Ricoeur has called ‘the paradox of the exchange at the very place of the irreplaceable.’ It is here
then, in the dispossessive act whereby the self assumes
the burdens of the other, and thus accepts the surplus of
its own identity, that we should recognize the veiled presence of being” ( 17).
6
Ibid., 33.
7
Ibid., 35.
8
Ibid., 220.
9
Ibid., 158.
10
Ibid., 43. Davies does commend Rahner’s ontology for its anti-reductionistic character, yet he asserts that
Rahner ontology continues to disqualify notions of the
self as ineluctably mediated by otherness: “But [Rahner’s
ontology] is still in a Kantian-Heideggerian world, governed by the cognitive faculties of the self, rather than a
world that comes to existence only as the self is given
over, without remainder, into the alien power of the
other” (Ibid., 158).
11
For Tillich and Davies, there is a dialectic relationship between ontology and existence that disavows total
essentialism. Moreover, both thinkers envision the encounter between self and other in self-reflexive terms.
Davies describes this impact on the self as transfiguration,
or the appropriate word for transcendence that “retains the
irreducible mutuality of self and other, albeit as unity in
opposition” (Ibid., 43). Tillich speaks of the self-reflexive
impact on the self as insight, conversion, or reunion (albeit ambiguously experienced) of the self with self, other,
and world.
12
A History of Christian Thought, 438. Tillich offers
a similar assessment in Theology of Culture, 92, original
emphasis, when he asserts that “Schelling follows Hegel
in emphasizing the ‘subject’ and its freedom against Substance and its necessity. But while in Hegel the ‘subject’
is immediately identified with the thinking subject, in
Schelling it becomes rather the ‘existing’ or immediately
experiencing subject.” In his own writing, Schelling identifies Hegel’s method as one demanding that “[philosophy] should withdraw into pure thinking, and that it
should have as sole immediate object the pure concept”
(On the History of Modern Philosophy, 134).
13
In Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in
Schelling’s Philosophical Development, 31, Tillich describes this contradiction: “Guilt-consciousness is the
religious expression for the absolute contradiction between God and man.” Emil Fackenheim, “Schelling’s
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Conception of Positive Philosophy,” The Review of Metaphysics VII (1954), 565. Fackenheim clarifies Schelling’s
characterization of negative philosophy: “Negative philosophy is not metaphysics, but the search for the metaphysical principle” ( 579). He concludes ( 582) that
Schelling’s fusion of negative and positive philosophy—
while historically undervalued—ultimately fails. For further study of Schelling’s philosophy and its reception,
please see Dale Snow, Schelling and the End of Idealism,
Robert Brown, The Later Philosophy of Schelling, Robert
Scharlemann, “Tillich and Schelling on the Principle of
Identity,” The Journal of Religion 56 (1976): 105-112,
and Thomas O’Meara, “F.W.J. Schelling,” The Review of
Metaphysics XXI (1977): 283-309.
14
Ages of the World, 73. Schelling’s contentious
claim of the Yes and No of God is further intensified by
the order envisaged by Schelling: “The negating, contracting will must precede into revelation so that there is
something that shores up and carries upward the grace of
the divine being, without which grace would not be capable of revealing itself. There must be Might before there
is Leniency and Stringency before Gentleness. There is
first Wrath, then Love. Only with Love does the wrathful
actually become God” (83). Robert Brown, in The Later
Philosophy of Schelling, 269, comments that here
Schelling moves beyond Böhme: whereas Böhme accounts for the dialectical character of God’s freedom,
“Ages moves only in the opposite direction. God begins as
a duality, and attains his unity only as an achievement, a
voluntary duality-in-unity.”
15
Tillich renders potency as “[t]he real, dark principle of the philosophy of nature [that] is nothing other than
the actualization of this contradiction. Freedom is the
power to become disunited from oneself. Consistent with
the meaning of the word, Schelling now calls this power
potency” (The Construction of the History of Religion in
Schelling’s Positive Philosophy: Its Presuppositions and
Principles, 48). Schelling makes the same point in The
Ages of the World, Section 226, 17: “A being cannot negate itself as actual without at the same time positing oneself as the actualizing potency that begets itself.”
16
Mysticism and Guilt-Consciousness in Schelling’s
Philosophical Development, 99 original emphasis. In The
Courage to Be, 180, Tillich further elaborates on the importance of the Yes-No dialectic for the living God:
“Nonbeing makes God a living God. Without the No he
has to overcome in himself and in his creatures, the divine
Yes to himself would be lifeless. There would be no revelation of the ground of being, there would be no life.”
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17

In Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 421, Tillich
elaborates on this point with respect to the Trinity: “There
is no blessedness where there is no conquest of the opposite possibility, and there is no life where there is no ‘otherness.’ The trinitarian symbol of the Logos as the principle of divine self-manifestation in creation and salvation
introduces the element of otherness into the Divine Life
without which it would not be life.”
18
For elaboration on these differences, please see
Jerome Stone’s “Tillich and Schelling’s Later Philosophy,” in Kairos and Logos: Studies in the Roots and Implications of Tillich’s Theology, edited by John Carey, 335. Stone’s list includes some straightforward distinctions
(e.g., Schelling was not a theologian), but it also notes an
important “shift between Schelling and Tillich from the
language of speculating to the language of symbol” (35).
Additionally, Ian Thompson, in his Being and Meaning,
89, writes: “Schelling tends to subordinate theology to the
philosophy of art, whereas in Tillich’s case art is put to
use in the service of theology.”
19
Each of these writers themselves experienced these
phenomena in varying degrees. Bataille battled a pulmonary disease throughout his life to the point where it became debilitating; Kristeva emigrated from Bulgaria to
France; and Levinas endured a double tragedy: his family
died in the Holocaust, and as a French soldier, he became
a prisoner of war in Germany.
20
Inner Experience, 11.
21
Ibid., 43.
22
Ibid., 59.
23
Though Bataille concentrates his critiques on
Hegel, Amy Hollywood describes the extent to which
Bataille’s disdain toward project also distinguishes his
views from Sartre’s: “Sartre’s and Bataille’s opposing
attitudes toward human projects are crucial here. Sartre
insists that to be human is to engage in projects; Bataille
argues that inner experience is the opposite of project;
thus he generates endlessly recursive negations of his own
attempt to provide a method for attaining inner experience” (Sensible Ecstasy, 30). Indeed, there is a certain
paradox within Bataille’s writing in that he seeks to refute
system by constructing his own system of atheology or of
the unfinished system of nonknowledge.
24
Inner Experience, 12.
25
The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge, 203.
26
Inner Experience, 52.
27
Ibid., 113.
28
The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge, 21.
Bataille reiterates that “[t]he impossible is the loss of the
self” (Ibid., 24).
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Amy Hollywood castigates Bataille’s use of the
tortured victim on ethical and ideological grounds:
“Bataille’s practice is problematic in that he seems to use
another human being’s unchosen suffering as a means
toward his own ecstatic anguish. Even if we read that ecstatic anguish as itself an ethical response to the meaninglessness of the other’s radically contingent torment, problems remain, for it is not clear that who suffers is in fact
so radically contingent. Rather, differences in race, class,
gender, sexuality, and ethnicity make it more likely that
members of one or another particular group will be the
subject of physical torture and thus serve as the noncontingent means through which the contingency of human
bodily experience finds experience” (Sensible Ecstasy,
95).
30
Inner Experience, 120.
31
Ibid., 104.
32
Among a myriad examples, Bataille contends that
“the will to salvation signifies the resolution to escape the
impossible” (The Unfinished System of Nonknowledge,
21). Bataille does acknowledge affinities between ecstasy
and mystical theology or negative theology, but he avers
that ecstasy equates to atheology that is “totally negative”
(Ibid., 146). Contemplation of the cross can be efficacious
to the extent that one substitutes oneself for Christ: “Essentially, we must reflect on the crucifixion and place
ourselves in the situation of personal assumption, abandoning respect in the name of transgression” (Ibid., 236).
33
Systematic Theology, Volume 1, 113.
34
In terms of the Scriptural sources, Tillich locates
the presence of ecstasy in the writings of Paul: “The unity
of ecstasy and structure is classically expressed in Paul’s
doctrine of the Spirit. Paul is primarily the theologian of
the Spirit” (Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 116). Paul
further envisages the fusion of ecstasy and structure
through Spirit in his letter to the Corinthians: “In the
hymn to agape in I Corinthians, chapter 13, the structure
of the moral imperative and the ecstasy of the Spiritual
Presence are completely united. Similarly, the first three
chapters of the same letter indicate a way to unite the
structure of cognition with the ecstasy of the Spiritual
Presence” (Ibid., 117). Tillich additionally points to the
Gospels as illustrative of ecstasy: “Ecstatic experiences
appear again and again in the Gospel stories. They show
the Spiritual Presence driving Jesus into the desert, leading him through the visionary experiences of temptation,
giving him the power of divination with respect to people
and events, and making him the conqueror of demonic
powers and the Spiritual healer of mind and body” (Ibid.,
144). In terms of the philosophical sources, Plato but es-
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pecially Neo-Platonists such as Plotinus uphold the
unique place of ecstasy. Tillich identifies the Middle Platonist Philo as one of the earliest figures who “developed
a doctrine of ecstasy, or ek-stasis, which means ‘standing
outside oneself.’ This is the highest form of piety which
lies beyond faith” (A History of Christian Thought, 13).
This philosophical conception of ecstasy has subsequently
impacted Christian theologians and mystics, including
Origen, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Bonaventure.
35
Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 112; Ibid., 112.
Ecstasy therefore helps further clarify the experience of
God as being-itself or the ground of being enables one to
speak rationally and ecstatically at the same time. This
speaking about God refers back to the self and its ordinary/ ecstatic experience of holiness: “The term ‘ecstatic’
in the phrase ‘ecstatic idea of God’ points to the experience of the holy as transcending ordinary experience
without removing it. Ecstasy as a state of mind is the exact correlate to self-transcendence as the state of reality.
Such an understanding of the idea of God is neither naturalistic nor supranaturalistic. It underlies the whole of the
present theological system” (Systematic Theology, Volume 2, 8).
36
Ibid., 112.
37
Tillich describes prophetic witness (“Prophets
speak in terms which express the ‘depth of reason’ and its
ecstatic experience” Systematic Theology, Volume 1,
143), agapic love (“As the ecstatic participation in the
transcendent unity of unambiguous life, agape is experienced as blessedness” (Systematic Theology, Volume 3,
136), and prayer (“A union of subject and object has
taken place in which the independent existence of each is
overcome; new unity is created. The best and most universal example of an ecstatic experience is the pattern of
prayer.” Ibid., 119).
38
Powers of Horror, in The Portable Kristeva: Updated Edition, 230.
39
Ibid., 235 (original emphasis)
40
Tales of Love, 248-249. Kristeva further elaborates
on this heterogeneity: “We lives on that border, crossroads beings, crucified beings. A woman is neither nomadic nor a male body that considers itself earthly only in
erotic passion. A mother is a continuous separation, a
division of the very flesh. And consequently a division of
language—and it has always been so.” (Ibid., 254).
41
Levinas describes the pure passivity demanded by
the maternal body: “The-one-for-another has the form of
sensibility or vulnerability, pure passivity or susceptibility, passive to the point of becoming an inspiration, that
is, alterity in the same, the trope of the body animated by
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the soul, psyche in the form of a hand that gives even the
bread taken from its own mouth. Here the psyche in the
maternal body” (Otherwise than Being, 67).
42
Ibid., 374.
43
Dynamics of Faith, 106. In Gilkey on Tillich, 29,
Langdon Gilkey indicates that Tillich subsumes the fusion
of these dimensions in and through self-awareness: “In us,
being is ‘present to itself,’ aware of itself, its body, its
environment, its space and time, its future. Here the inorganic, the organic, the psychic, and what even transcends
these, are wedded together in our awareness of our own
being.”
44
In “Being and Word in Tillich’s Doctrine of Spiritual Presence: Issues of Subjectivity and Relationality,” in
Being versus Word in Paul Tillich’s Theology?, edited by
Gert Hummel and Doris Lax, Stenger probes Tillich’s
interconnection of being and Word that funds his relational ontology through the Spiritual Presence. Though
she concedes his appreciation of the body could be more
extensive, Stenger holds that his relational ontology
“resonates well with several feminist approaches [e.g.,
Sheila Davaney, Catherine Keller, Thandeka, Linell
Cady] [because] it affirms the self, including the body,
draws humans outwardly toward each other, and directs
them toward that which is ultimate in a response of devotion and commitment” (296).
45
Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 294.
46
“Dimensions, Levels, and the Unity of Life,” in
Main Works, Volume 6: Theological Writings, edited by
Gert Hummel, 404.
47
Tillich’s capacious conception of the person extends to displaced persons such as refugees; his vigilance
against reducing them to things comports with Kristeva’s
perspective. In Strangers to Ourselves in The Portable
Kristeva: Updated Edition, 265, Kristeva writes: “Let us
not seek to solidify, to turn the otherness of the foreigner
into a thing. Let us merely touch it, brush by it, without
giving a permanent structure.” Similarly, in “The Theology of Pastoral Care: The Spiritual and Theological
Foundations of Pastoral Care,” The Meaning of Health,
125, Tillich discusses the dehumanizing treatment of
refugees as objects: “It was one of my early experiences
in this country to come to the sharp realization that the
refugees, who felt themselves to be persons, became objects and nothing more than objects when they were transformed into cases to be dealt with twenty minutes by the
social worker. It often broke their self-awareness as a
person. This example shows that the problem of becoming an object applies to all forms of taking care of someone, be it the social, the educational, the political, the

Bulletin of the North American Paul Tillich Society

medical, or the psycho-therapeutic function. In all of them
the heart of the subject-object problem is of decisive importance.”
48
Totality and Infinity, 43. Levinas contends that the
Western tradition “guarantees knowledge its congenital
synthesizing and its self-sufficiency, foreshadowing the
systematic unity of consciousness, and the integration of
all that is other into the system and the present” (“Philosophy and Transcendence” in Alterity and Transcendence, 12). Levinas’s censure of ontology and system is
not limited to the epistemological level; a fortiori Levinas
claims that the totality of ontology and system underlies
the totalitarianism of the state (e.g., Nazism): “Ontology
as first philosophy is a philosophy of power” (Totality
and Infinity, 46). Tillich contends that power underpins
love and justice, but love and justice impose constraints
on power.
49
Levinas, in “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas”
(with Richard Kearney) in Face to Face with Levinas,
edited by Richard Cohen, 20, contends that “Dasein is its
history to the extent that it can interpret and narrate its
existence as a finite and contemporaneous story, a totalizing experience of past, present, and future.”
50
Otherwise Than Being, 183. The face, in fact, “is
the very collapse of phenomenality” (Ibid., 88).
51
Ibid., 42.
52
Ibid., 46.
53
Ibid., 49.
54
Ibid., 119.
55
Ibid., 122. In Ibid., 156, Levinas develops the same
point: “The Infinite does not enter into a theme like a being to be given in it, and thus belie its beyond being.”
56
Ibid., 14.
57
In the Time of Many Nations, translated by Michael
Smith, 111.
58
Otherwise Than Being, 10.
59
“The Proximity of the Other,” in Alterity and Transcendence, 98. In consonance with Kristeva’s analysis of
maternity, Levinas asserts that otherness precedes one’s
own body: “The sensible—maternity, vulnerability, apprehension—binds the node of incarnation into a plot
larger than the apperception of self. In this plot I am
bound to others before being tied to my body” (Otherwise
Than Being, 76).
60
Otherwise than Being, 182 (my emphasis). In the
same text, Levinas describes the same phenomenon where
“one discloses oneself by neglecting one’s defenses, leaving a shelter, exposing oneself to outrage, to insults and
wounding” (Ibid., 49). The image of “leaving a shelter”
further differentiates Levinas’s account from Tillich’s
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notions of love, reunion of the separated, and morality,
constitution of the person as person in the encounter with
other persons. In “Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas”
(with Richard Kearney) in Face to Face with Levinas,
edited by Richard Cohen, 22, Levinas distinguishes his
preferred notion of sociality from the reductive concept of
unity: “Man’s relationship with the other is better as difference than as unity: sociality is better than fusion. The
very value of love is the impossibility of reducing the
other to myself.”
61
“Philosophy and Transcendence,” in Alterity and
Transcendence, 5. “God” as the Infinite Other receives
significant treatment in Levinas’s writings, particularly
his reflections on the Talmud. Levinas conceptualizes
religion in terms of moral experience (“Religious experience, at least for the Talmud, can only be primarily a
moral experience,” “Toward the Other,” in Nine Talmudic
Readings, translated and with an introduction by Annette
Aronowicz), where, for example, “[t]he image of God is
better honored in the right given to the stranger than in
symbols” (Ibid., 28). When comparing these conceptions
to Tillich’s, we can thus note similarities (Tillich also
unites morality and religion) as well as differences (Tillich prefers the language of symbols, not obligations to
the others, as that which expresses the imago Dei. One
should not overstate these similarities or differences. For
example, I argue that there is significant resonance between Tillich’s symbol of the “God beyond God” and
Levinas’s symbol of the transcendent face: “it is as if the
face of the other person, which straightaway ‘demands of
me’ and ordains me, were the mode of the very intrigue of
God’s surpassing the idea of God, and of every idea
where He would be aimed at, visible, and known, and
where the Infinite would be denied through thematization,
in presence or representation” (“The Old and the New,” in
Time and the Other (and Additional Essays), translated by
Richard Cohen, 136-137, my emphasis). For an extended
comparison between notions of God in Levinas and Christian theology, specifically Barth’s theology, please see
Steven Smith, The Argument to the Other: Reason Beyond Reason in the Thought of Karl Barth and Emmanuel
Levinas.
62
Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, as quoted by Frank Schalow in “The Typography of Heidegger’s Concept of Conscience,” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Volume LXIX
(1995), 260.
63
For Tillich’s presentation of the ‘silent voice,’ see
Morality and Beyond, 24, 34 (“the silent voice of man’s
own essential nature”), and 80 (‘mode of silence’).
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Theology of Culture, 138-139. By contrast, Levinas
submits that conscience “welcomes the Other” and “calls
in question the naïve rights of my powers, my glorious
spontaneity as a living being” (Totality and Infinity, 84).
65
Against the Third Reich, 213.
66
Morality and Beyond, 65.
67
Ibid., 77. Thus, like Levinas where “transcendence
is compressed into the sphere of intersubjective existence” (Edith Wyschogrod, “God and ‘Being’s Move’ in
the Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas,” The Journal of
Religion 62 (1982), 146), Tillich affirms transcendence as
encounter (e.g., the moment of kairos experienced as
revelation) that supersedes the self. Yet, unlike Levinas,
Tillich reinscribes this transcendence as constitutive of
the formation of the moral and cultural dimensions of the
self: “Religion, or the self-transcendence of life under the
dimension of spirit, is essentially related to morality and
culture. There is no self-transcendence under the dimension of the spirit without the constitution of the moral self
by the unconditional imperative, and this selftranscendence cannot take form except within the universe of meaning created in the cultural act” (Systematic
Theology, Volume 3, 95).
68
In the Time of Many Nations, translated by Michael
Smith, 110.
69
“Life and Selfhood in Tillich’s Theology,” in Kairos and Logos: Studies in the Roots and Implications of
Tillich’s Theology, edited by John Carey, 182.
70
Hospitality of the Stranger, 41.
71
See, inter alia, “Das Religiöse Symbol,” in Main
Works, Volume 4: Writings in the Philosophy of Religion,
edited by John Clayton, 213-228. There Tillich develops
further distinctions, including the two levels of religious
symbols, the first level of “religiösen Gegenstandssymbole” (objective religious symbols) and the second level
of “religiösen Hinweissymbole” (self-transcending religious symbols) (Ibid., 221-224 original emphasis). In his
Dynamics of Faith, 41-43, Tillich adumbrates six features
of a symbol: it points beyond itself; it participates in that
to which it points; it opens us levels of reality which otherwise are closed to us; it unlocks dimensions and elements of our soul which correspond to the dimensions and
elements of reality; it cannot be produced intentionally;
and it cannot be invented. In his 1961 “The Meaning and
Justification of Religious Symbols,” Main Works, Volume
4: Writings in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by John
Clayton, 415-420, Tillich identifies slightly different
characteristics of a symbol: it points beyond itself; it participates in the reality of that which it represents; it cannot
be created at will; it has power to open up dimensions of
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reality, in correlation to dimensions of the human spirit;
and it possesses an integrating and disintegrating power.
The negation of symbols, of course, derives from Tillich’s
Protestant principle that repudiates any notion of absolutism within symbols.
72
Systematic Theology, Volume 3, 134. Put differently, “[l]ove as the reunion of those who are separate
does not distort or destroy in its union” (Systematic Theology, Volume 1, 282).
73
Ibid., 134.
74
Ibid., 137.
75
The issue of justice, or the appearance of the third,
poses challenges for Levinas. He affirms the centrality of
justice, but he does fully resolve tensions between the
relationship of self and other as hostage and lord and the
order and thematization of justice: “The third party introduces a contradiction in the saying whose signification
before the other until then went in one direction. It is of
itself the limit of responsibility and the birth of the question: What do I have to do with justice? A question of
consciousness. Justice is necessary, that is, comparison,
coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order,
thematization, the visibility of faces, and thus intentionality and the intellect, the intelligibility of a system, and
thence also a co-presence on an equal footing as before a
court of justice (Otherwise than Being, 157).
Theodore de Boer, in “An Ethical Transcendental
Philosophy,” in Face to Face with Levinas, edited by
Richard Cohen, argues that the presence of the third problematizes Levinas’s notions of unlimited responsibility:
“The entrance onto the scene of the third man makes a
comparison and weighing of responsibility necessary—
and thereby also a thematizing and theorizing. This implies a certain correction, as Levinas puts it leniently, of
the infinite demands that the other imposes upon me”
(102, original emphasis).
76
These works include Dialogues of Paul Tillich
(2002) by Mary Ann Stenger and Ronald Stone, Self-Love
and Christian Ethics (2002) by Darlene Fozard Weaver,
Religion in the New Millennium: Theology in the Spirit of
Paul Tillich (2001) edited by Raymond Bulman and Frederick Parrella, and Tillich and World Religions: Encountering Other Faiths Today (2003) by Robison James.

